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Abstract. 
The Net Present Value maximizing model has a respectable ancestry and is considered by most 
scholars a theoretically sound decision model. In real-life applications, decision makers use the NPV rule, 
but apply a subjectively determined hurdle rate, as opposed to the “correct” opportunity cost of capital. 
According to a heuristics-and-biases-program approach, this implies that the hurdle-rate rule is a biased 
heuristic. This work shows that the hurdle-rate rule may be interpreted as a fruitful strategy of bounded 
rationality, where several domain-specific and project-specific elements are integrated and condensed into 
an aspiration level. The paper also addresses the issue of a productive cooperation between bounded and 
unbounded rationality.  
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Investment decisions, net present value and bounded rationality 
 
Introduction 
This paper deals with the Net Present Value (NPV) methodology, a widely used tool for investment 
decisions. It is considered theoretically sound and normatively suggested in many corporate finance 
textbooks (e.g. Copeland & Weston, 1988; Bierman & Smidt, 1992; Rao, 1992; Damodaran, 1999; 
Copeland, Koller & Murrin, 2000; Brealey & Myers, 2000; Fernández, 2002).  The concept of NPV is the 
brick of a normative building deep-rooted in the maximizing tradition of economics. The NPV methodology 
may be summarized as follows: suppose a decision maker has the opportunity of investing X0 in a one-
period project generating a payoff X1. Let i be the project’s rate of return and denote with ρ  the return rate 
of the next-best alternative available to the investor; the project should be undertaken if and only if 
0)1(
1
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ρ
X
X .      (1) 
The left-hand side of (1) is called the project’s Net Present Value. The NPV rule says that the decision 
maker should invest in the project if its NPV is positive. The discount rate ρ  is the so-called opportunity 
cost of capital: if a decision maker invests in the project she foregoes the opportunity of earning ρ  on her 
capital X0. The opportunity cost of capital is then taken as a norm (in the sense of Kahneman & Miller, 
1986) and represents the return that the investor would earn if she invested in the alternative course of 
action (see Buchanan, 1969). In general, if one faces two or more mutually exclusive courses of action, one 
should calculate their NPVs by discounting cash flows at the respective opportunity cost of capital and 
choose the one with the highest NPV. The NPV model traces back to Fisher (1930), whose analysis is 
carried out under assumption of certainty, and may be formally derived from the following constrained 
optimization problem, where the investor must select the optimal consumption plan:  
 
11100010 )1)((  subject to),(max cXmcXmccu =+++−− ρ    (2) 
 
where u(·) denotes the investor’s utility function, ρ  is the market interest rate and ct, mt, and Xt  are, 
respectively, the consumption, the income, and the investment flow at time  t = 1, 2. Eq. (2) represents the 
so-called Fisher model. It provides for a separation theorem (optimal investment plan is the same regardless 
of the optimal consumption bundle) and for a derivation of the net present value rule as in eq. (1) (see 
McMinn, 2005). Under uncertainty, one cannot say a priori that, for example, an expected return of 100 is 
preferable to an expected return of 90 if the former is riskier than the latter: one is preferable in terms of 
return, the other one is preferable in terms of risk (risk-aversion is assumed). So, if alternatives are not 
equivalent in risk, the NPV rule may not be employed as such, because it only creates a partial ordering 
among alternatives. There is the need of a theoretically correct cost of capital accounting for risk. Among 
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other models, portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 
1964; Mossin, 1966) have been developed in corporate finance for explaining the relation between risk and 
return. The mathematical link between these models and the NPV rule has been provided by several 
scholars, who proved, since late Sixties, that maximization of shareholders wealth is equivalent to 
maximization of NPV, where the cost of capital ρ  in eq. (1) is the expected rate of return of a traded asset 
equivalent in risk to the project under consideration (equal systematic risk) and it is computed by making 
use of the CAPM security market line (e.g.Tuttle & Litzenberger, 1968; Hamada, 1969; Bierman & Hass, 
1973; Mossin, 1969; Rubinstein, 1973). 
A more recent version of the NPV rule is the “expanded NPV” (Trigeorgis, 1986, Dixit & Pindyck, 
1994), which makes use of arbitrage pricing or, alternatively, stochastic dynamic programming. It aims at 
taking into account possible options intrinsic in the project (option to wait, to abandon, to switch, to 
temporarily suspend, to enlarge scale, etc.). Proponents of the expanded NPV often call their approach “real 
options approach”, which is but a sophisticated version of the traditional NPV model, where the set of 
alternatives is inclusive of the options implicit in the project: “one can always redefine NPV by subtracting 
from the conventional calculation the opportunity cost of exercising the option to invest, and then say that 
the rule ‘invest if NPV is positive’ holds once this correction has been made” (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 
7). In other words, while the label ‘real options approach’ is widespread in the literature, “if others prefer to 
continue to use ‘positive NPV’ terminology, that is fine as long as they are careful to include all relevant 
option values in their definition of NPV” (ibidem).1 
Past and recent empirical evidence shows that actual decision makers turn the NPV model to a rule 
of thumb: they use a subjective discount rate as opposed to a rational cost of capital derived from some 
market model (e.g. CAPM, arbitrage theory, multifactor models). As a result, they employ a criterion 
generated in the realm of unbounded rationality but give it a distinctive bounded-rationality flavor. This 
paper aims at showing that this mixed rule may prove useful: the bounded/unbounded dichotomy peters out 
and the hybrid rule discloses a beneficial cooperation between bounded and unbounded rationality.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 surveys some empirical evidence on the use of hurdle 
rates by real-life decision makers so that the NPV rule is interpretable as a bounded-rationality strategy.  
Section 2 presents evidence that the hurdle-rate NPV rule may furnish close-to-optimal results when 
compared with the expanded NPV and that it may be viewed as a comprehensive methodology that takes 
account of several domain-specific and project-specific variables. Section 3 shows that the allegedly sound 
maximizing NPV have several shortcomings, among which inconsistencies with accepted standards of 
rationality. Section 4 briefly hints at a normative role of bounded rationality and section 5 presents some 
evidence indicating that the NPV rule is hardly interpretable as rigorously pertaining to either side of 
rationality. Some remarks conclude the paper. 
 
                                           
1
 A precursory example of the use of NPV for valuing real options may be found in Merrett & Sykes (1973, p. 129). 
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1. The hurdle-rate heuristic 
There is some awareness in the corporate finance literature that actual decision makers use the NPV 
rule but do not use the cost of capital suggested by corporate finance textbooks. They employ a subjective 
hurdle rate. Brigham (1975) surveyed 33 large, relatively sophisticated firms. Although 94% of them used 
DCF methodology, only 61% of the firms using DCF adopted the cost of capital as the discount rate. 
Summers (1987) surveyed corporations on investment decision criteria finding that 94% of reporting firms 
use the NPV rule employing a discount rate independent of risk, which is suggestive of the use of hurdle 
rates. Dixit (1992) recognizes that “firms invest in projects that they expect to yield a return in excess of a 
required or ‘hurdle’ rate” (p. 107). “Finance scholars have always been puzzled by the durability of … the 
hurdle rate rule” (Ross, 1995) and, in actual facts, “we know that hurdle rates ... are used in practice” 
(McDonald, 2000, p. 30); “it appears common for firms to use investment criteria that do not strictly 
implement the NPV criterion” (ibidem, p. 13), so that their “actions do not reflect the application of current 
financial theory” (Gitman & Mercurio, 1982, p. 29). Graham and Harvey (2002) surveyed 392 companies, 
and despite the fact many companies claimed they do employ the NPV technique and use CAPM for 
estimating the cost of capital, they point out that the use of hurdle rates is predominant. In particular, “small 
firms are significantly less likely to use the NPV criterion or the capital asset pricing model and its variants” 
(p. 22). They find that sometimes the use of hurdle rates is explicitly acknowledged: “small firms were 
inclined to use a cost of equity determined by “what investors tell us to require” [and a] majority (in fact, 
nearly 60%) of the companies said that they would use a single-company wide discount rate to evaluate a 
new investment project, even though different projects are likely to have different risk characteristics” (p. 
12). Jagannathan and Meier (2002) (henceforth J&M)2 observe that “managers use a … hurdle rate” (p. 3) 
instead of employing a CAPM-derived cost of capital. Relying on Poterba and Summers’ (1995) analysis, 
they find that “hurdle rates are not … linked to the cost of capital” (p. 22). These findings suggest that 
actual choice behaviors violate normative NPV and decision makers interpret the rule as a satisficing 
strategy (Simon, 1955), letting the discount rate be a predetermined cutoff level which is considered 
satisfactory. Let i  be the (expected) rate of return of the project, and let k  be a hurdle rate subjectively 
prefixed by the evaluator. A simple heuristic is the following:  
 
undertake the project if ki > , 
otherwise search for another alternative until the inequality is satisfied. 
 
It is evident that such a rule may also be rephrased in terms of NPV, with the hurdle rate k  as the discount 
rate: given that )1(01 iXX += , the decision maker will accept an investment with initial outlay X0 and 
(expected) final return X1 if and only if 0)1/(10 >++− kXX . The investment NPV is calculated with the 
rate k , which represents the minimum rate of return acceptable by the investor. This rule is formally 
                                           
2
 All following quotations from J&M (2002) refer to the internet version. 
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analogous to eq. (2) but is cognitively different. Replacing ρ  with k means shifting from the idea of 
comparing equivalent-risk alternatives to the idea of accepting a satisfactory rate of return. Both ρ  and k  
are cutoff rates, but the former refers to an objectively determined equivalent-risk alternative, the latter 
refers to a subjectively determined aspiration level. So doing, one leaves the realm of unbounded rationality 
and reaches the land of bounded rationality. Yet, both rules are expression of an NPV criterion, relying as 
they are on discounting cash flows at a prefixed discount rate.  The investor invests in the project if the 
value of her payoff function, calculated at the hurdle rate k , is positive; that is, if the rate of return of the 
project exceeds the aspiration level k . By adopting the hurdle-rate heuristic the evaluator does not confine 
herself to equivalent-risk alternatives. No alternative course of action is called up, no comparison is 
accomplished, no maximization is involved. The rate k  is not a rate of return of an existing alternative, and 
therefore it is not an opportunity cost and does not represent a foregone return. It is a subjective threshold 
that identifies the personal minimum required rate of return from the project. The heuristic-minded reasoner 
is uninterested in knowing whether there exists or not an alternative (either equivalent in risk or not) better 
than the one under examination, she is just interested in reaching that aspiration level, for subjective 
reasons.  
 
2. Does the NPV heuristic work? 
McDonald (2000) contrasts the hurdle-rate rule with the expanded NPV. The author aims at 
investigating “whether the use of seemingly arbitrary investment criteria, such as hurdle rates and 
profitability indexes, can proxy for the use of more sophisticated real options valuation” (p. 13). He 
wonders whether such “simple rules are relatively robust to changes in project characteristics” and whether 
“a single hurdle-rate rule [can] yield approximately correct decisions for these projects” (p. 15). Focusing 
on an option-to-wait decision problem, and implementing variations in the cash-flow growth rate, the 
project volatility, the discount rate, he shows that 
 
for a wide range of project characteristics, fixed-hurdle rate and profitability index rule can provide a 
 good approximation to optimal investment timing decisions, in the sense that the ex ante loss from 
 following the suboptimal rule is small; it is possible to follow the wrong investment rule without losing much 
 of the ex ante value of the investment timing option. In fact, as the investment timing option becomes 
 worth more and it becomes optimal to wait longer to invest, the option value becomes less sensitive to errors 
 in investment rules.” (p. 15) 
 
He explains that even though the rise in the discount rate lowers the project value, it also lowers the value at 
which investment becomes optimal, so that “a decision rule of the form ‘invest when the project has an 
internal rate of return of 20%’ might in fact be appropriate for a wide variety of projects” (p. 15). He 
underlines that “for a variety of parameters, particular hurdle-rate … rules can provide close-to-optimal 
investment decisions. Thus, it may be that firms using seemingly arbitrary ‘rules of thumb’ are 
approximating optimal decisions” (p. 13, italics added). J&M (2002) reach the same conclusion holding that 
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the use of hurdle rates should not be deemed less reliable than the use of the opportunity cost of capital as a 
discount rate: “managers … [take] the right decisions … because they use a hurdle rate that is higher than 
the cost of capital to capture the option to wait” (p. 12).3 Although these authors do not recommend the use 
of aspiration levels and rules of thumb as decisions making criteria4 it is worth noting that their conclusions 
implicitly foster the idea that advantages can be taken from undertaking a simple heuristic: 
 
[a] “the advantage of using a hurdle rate is that modelling all possible future options is not 
necessary” (J&M, 2002, p. 4) and decision makers may “find it useful to use a rule that best justifies 
making intuitively plausible investment  decisions” (McDonald, 2000, p. 26) 
[b] “managers adjust these rules … when an investment is strategic and expiring.” (McDonald, 
2000, p. 30). 
[c] “use [of a hurdle-rate rule] in practice might stem from the success of apparently arbitrary rules 
that are revealed over time to be close to optimal. Managers likely observe the capital budgeting 
practices, in their own and other companies, and in many cases probably mimic what seems to 
work” (ibidem). 
 
It is worth noting that [a], [b] and [c] fit the three premises on which Gigerenzer (2001) bases his notion of 
adaptive toolbox: 
 
[A] psychological plausibility: models of decision-making should have adequate regard “for the 
constraints in time, knowledge, and computational capacities that humans face” (Gigerenzer, 2001, 
p. 38) 
[B] domain specificity: “each heuristic is specialized for certain classes of problems, which means 
that most of them are not applicable in a given situation” (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 32) and 
“what works to make quick and accurate inferences in one domain may well not work in another. 
Thus, different environments can have different … heuristics” (Gigerenzer, Todd & the ABC 
Research Group, 1999, p. 18) 
[C] ecological rationality: this consists in “the match between the structure of a  heuristic and the 
structure of an environment” (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001a, p. 9). Heuristics are ecologically rational 
in that “they are adapted to particular environments … [and] can be fast, frugal and accurate by 
exploiting the structure of information in natural environments” (ibidem). 
                                           
3
 Some other authors are puzzled by the “intriguing paradox” of such near-optimal choice behaviors: “we have 
compelling evidence that managers … often do not use real option techniques … On the other hand, strategic decisions 
under uncertainty appear to conform to some general expectations based on real option theory … The resolution of this 
paradox would seem to be that, despite their biases, managers’ strategic investment decisions can loosely conform to 
normative real options models. Managers may employ real option reasoning, without getting all the details correct … 
Managers’ investment decisions may be ‘directionally correct’, even if they are not completely unbiased” (Miller & 
Shapira, 2004, p. 281). However, the authors admit that actual choice behaviors take account of variables disregarded 
by normative models: “normative models for pricing options overlook key aspects of the behavioral and organizational 
contexts in which investment decisions occur” (p. 282). 
4
  “We do not suggest that managers should use these rules of thumb” (McDonald, 2000, p. 30). 
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Sentences in [a] exemplify the psychological plausibility [A] of the NPV heuristic (decision makers are not 
able to take into account all possible future opportunities and outcomes). Sentence [b] reveals that these 
rules are domain-specific [B] in the sense that when the context changes (strategic investments versus 
nonstrategic investments, expiring versus nonexpiring projects) the rule is changed or is combined with 
other rules of thumb (and that the aspiration levels are adjusted too, as suggested by J&M. See above). For 
example, while the NPV heuristic seems to work well for a variety of industrial projects, the recognition 
heuristic (Borges et al., 1999; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 2002; Borges et al., 2008) is inapplicable in 
such frameworks. Also, the hurdle-rate rule seems to work least well in case of low volatility, but the errors 
may be avoided through a combination of rules (e.g. hurdle-rate and profitability index) to give rise to a 
different heuristic: “This suggests constructing a third rule as a hybrid of the two rules … Such a hybrid rule 
can prevent the large errors at extreme discount rates generated by either rule alone … this example … 
demonstrates that firms in practice might find it useful to … consider multiple  rules at once” (McDonald, 
2000, p. 26). Sentence [c] reveals that the use of the NPV heuristic is ecologically rational [C] due to 
success over time. McDonald’s words also implicitly suggest that the rules of thumb analyzed may be the 
result of imitation and social learning. In other terms, his words encourage the view that the satisficing NPV 
rule is a “do-what-others-do” (or “do-what-successful-people-do”) strategy (see Laland, 2001. See also 
Berg and Lien, 2003). 
J&M (2002) cite empirical researches showing that managers do not use the CAPM-derived cost of 
capital, contrary to the normative suggestion of most corporate finance textbooks. Decision makers apply 
hurdle rates which are usually higher than the cost of capital. The value of waiting to invest is underlined to 
explain this finding: “using high hurdle rates, companies in fact indirectly account for the existence of 
timing options” (p. 15).  Resting on Poterba and Summers’ (1995) data, they show that “a relatively high 
hurdle rate of 12.2 % is successful in capturing most of the option value as long as the uncertainty of 
projects’ cash flows is high” (J&M, 2002, p. 18) and “If we take into account the option to delay the 
project, the financial decision is no longer crucially dependent on an exact figure of the discount rate” (p. 
19). However, there are other explanations, which suggest that the use of hurdle rates is consistent with 
established theories in business and finance. For example, a project may absorb managerial skills and thus 
prevent firm from undertaking other profitable projects in the future. Thus, “If managerial time of a skilful 
manager is limited, she must decide when it is optimal to take a project. It may pay off to wait and not take 
the next best positive net present value project” (p. 21), which explains why “the use of a hurdle rate that is 
higher than the cost of capital … is likely to lead to near optimal decisions” (ibidem). This also explains the 
large variation that Poterba and Summers (1995) find in the hurdle rate of different companies: firms in the 
same sector face similar systematic risks and, therefore, if they complied with the CAPM-derived discount 
rate (which is based on systematic risk), they would apply similar discount rates. When managerial 
resources are in limited supply it is appropriate to use higher discount rates. This view is consistent with the 
resource-based theory and the literature on Top Management Teams, according to which managerial and 
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firm-specific skills play a pivotal role in value creation (Barney, 1986, 1991, 2001; Grant, 1991; Grant & 
Robert, 1995; Levinthal, 1995; Bromiley, 2005). Furthermore, if a project is strategic, it may be worth 
undertaking it even if its NPV (computed with the “correct” cost of capital) is negative, because it promises 
future opportunities. In this case the use of a discount rate smaller than the cost of capital should be 
appropriate. Actually, J&M (2002) do affirm that “companies use low hurdle rates for strategic projects” 
(p. 22); “Because it is difficult to estimate the values of all possible upcoming investment opportunities and 
to assign probabilities how likely these will arise, companies seem to use a low hurdle rate that takes into 
account that the payoffs in the future are possibly higher than the strategic investment itself suggests” 
(ibidem); “there are strategic situations where making the first move has a commitment value” (Dixit, 1992, 
p. 119). The view is also consistent with the strategic management literature, according to which strategic 
decisions are drivers for competitive advantage (Collis & Montgomery, 1995; Quinn & Mintzberg, 1996). 
For these complex decisions the use of modelling is hardly helpful: “Even if highly simplified and 
abstracted, the associated SA [strategic assets] decision may not be solvable in closed-form equilibrium … 
For example, when modelled as a differential game, the problem will probably be not tractable” (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993, p. 40). Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986) and the costs of 
external financing may also play a role in determining a hurdle rate different from normative cost of capital. 
J&M construct a comprehensive NPV function taking account of agency costs and the costs of external 
financing. The authors claim that this is, according to some recent literature, the right NPV model to be 
maximized (pp. 23-27). That the costs of external financing may play a major role is also suggested by 
some empirical research about large reserves of cash retained in the firm (see Mikkelson & Parch, 1999).  
Brigham (1975) report that 39% of the respondents change the hurdle rate less than once in a year 
(p. 20, Exhibit 4), and 32% state that it “depends on conditions”: they “revise rates to reflect product and 
capital market condition, with revisions generally occurring less than once a year” (p. 20). Gitman and 
Mercurio (1982) report that 50.3% of the companies revise discount rates when environmental conditions 
change, 13% less frequently than annually, and 11.2% when a major project is evaluated (p. 27). The 
‘product and market condition’ seems to hint at Porter’s (1980) analysis, where variables such as rivalry, 
supplier power, buyer power, threat of substitutes, entry barriers are individuated as fundamental drivers for 
value creation. As seen above, decision makers raise the hurdle rate to account for the value of waiting, 
whereas strategic considerations tend to decrease it; changes in project’s risk may well imply changes in the 
threshold, but the notion of risk is not necessarily equivalent to a normative one: “Threshold levels will be 
revalued … In this revising of threshold levels … projects which would have a minor loss if they failed 
would face a less stringent screening than those that could bankrupt the organization” (Carter, 1971, p. 
426). That is, non-ruinous losses versus ruinous losses are given relevance. This concern about risk is 
“consistent with the bounded-rationality approach of Simon (1957)” (ibidem) but has nothing to do with 
usual capital budgeting textbook prescriptions: “the available models do not capture the essence of risk as 
defined by decision makers” (Laughhunn, Payne & Crum, 1980, p. 1248). 
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Overall, these findings evidence that hurdle rates are seen as reference levels that do not change 
quickly but “that may be gradually adjusted if they become too lax or binding a constraint” (Goodie et al., 
1999, p. 351). Historical documents as well reveal that the hurdle-rate rule, frequently used in past 
centuries, were used as base levels that could be adjusted: “If 15% tended to be the rule of thumb, it was not 
applied slavishly by the viewers” (Brackenborough, McLean & Oldroyd, 2001, p. 144), who used to change 
it “depending on the circumstances” (p. 143) (see also Section 5 below). In other words, decision makers 
condense into a base aspiration level several considerations related to uncertainty, decision flexibility, 
market conditions, future opportunities, limited managerial skills, agency costs, strategic considerations, but 
the heuristic is exploited in a nonrigid way so that the hurdle rate may change as the above factors change.  
 
3. Problems in the unboundedly rational NPV 
The unboundedly rational NPV rule has its own shortcomings. First of all, there is no one NPV, but 
a proliferation of NPVs differing in terms of risk measure implied, equilibrium model employed, 
mathematical technique adopted.5 There is no agreement among scholars on which one is the correct NPV. 
For example, “academics do not agree on an appropriate equilibrium model even for estimating firm-level 
discount rates, for which stock returns are observable; estimation of project-level discount rates is even 
more problematic” (McDonald, 2000, p. 21). Whatever the notion of risk, the equilibrium model, the 
mathematical technique, many of the assumptions required to implement it are often violated in real life. 
For example, the use of CAPM-derived cost of capital is often recommended in corporate finance.  Resting 
on a considerable amount of empirical results, J&M (2002) claim that “the CAPM, like all models, is only 
an abstraction from reality” (p. 5) and “there have been many academic challenges to the validity of the 
CAPM as applied in practice” (ibidem). Lander and Pincher (1998) find numerous disadvantages even in 
the use of the more sophisticated real-options approach (expanded NPV). They write: 
 
“Any decision-making framework model is subject to: inappropriate assumptions … poor estimation 
 procedures …failure to incorporate the effects of competition and the strengths and weakness of the firm into 
 all aspects of the investment opportunity, ineffective information gathering of performance and measurement 
 systems,  inappropriate emphasis on short-run goals and results, or excessive conservatism or optimism … 
 Many of the required modeling assumptions are often and consistently violated in a practical real options 
 application. The necessary additional assumptions required for mathematical tractability limit the scope of 
 applicability.” (pp. 542-543)  
 
Furthermore, “The proper treatment of risk is still a major source of concern” (Pinches, 1982, p. 9) and the 
plethora of risk measures such as “standard deviation, beta, certainty equivalent, risk-adjusted discount 
                                           
5
 The fuzzy-logic version of the NPV is a further recent addition to the numerous existing versions (Ward, 1989; Chiu 
& Park, 1994; Abdel-Kader, Dugdale & Taylor, 1998; Buckley, Eslami & Feuring, 2002). Admittedly, the cognitive 
implications of a cost of capital and a NPV based on fuzzy logic are an open issue. 
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rates, conditional probabilities, etc., can be illustrated but not completely agreed upon either in theory or in 
practice”  (Pinches, 1982, p. 11). Among several others, a most stringent assumption frequently used is the 
completeness of the market. This property makes it possible to construct a replicating portfolio which 
mimics the project’s payoffs. In this case the expected rate of return of the portfolio is taken as the cost of 
capital and a positive NPV indicates that, regardless of preferences, the investor benefits from undertaking 
the project and selling short the replicating portfolio. The approach is often called the options pricing 
approach. Barring the fact that short sales are often not allowed, arbitrageurs are nonetheless inevitably 
exposed to risk of losses (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), contrary to what textbook arbitrage suggests.  Above 
all, “without spanning, there is no theory for determining the ‘correct’ value for the discount rate ρ ” (Dixit 
& Pindyck, 1994, p. 152). Smith and Nau (1995) admit that “without a market equivalent for the efficiency 
uncertainty, we cannot construct a perfect replicating trading strategy or identify a unique risk-neutral 
probability distribution and thus we cannot determine a unique option-pricing value for the project.” (p. 
804).6 They illustrate an example where three strategies are possible and conclude that “the optimal strategy 
is unclear and all three strategies are potentially optimal” (p. 805). To put it in eco-logical terms: the 
assumptions of the normative NPV model do not fit the environment where decision makers operate. Nor is 
its success in the environment ever tested: “Finance scholars teach net present value is the right way to 
evaluate capital investments. We have no research showing firms that use this technique do better than other 
firms … They believe their theory so much that they do not need to test it” (Bromiley, 2005, p. 70). 
The heuristics-and-biases approach is a double-edge weapon. For example, among the various 
equilibrium models, “the predominant approach to estimating the cost of capital is to use the CAPM” 
(J&M, 2002, p. 28). The CAPM is massively endorsed in corporate finance (e.g. Copeland & Weston, 1988; 
Brealey & Myers, 2000; Koller, Goedhart & Wessels, 2005; Damodaran, 2006). “The CAPM provides a 
framework for estimating the appropriate opportunity cost to be used in evaluating an investment” (Rao, 
1992, p. 33). In a classical paper, Rubinstein (1973, footnote 10) proves that, if the CAPM assumptions are 
met, the project is profitable if and only if  
 
( )
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+>−  
 
with fr =risk-free rate, λ =market price of risk, mr~ =market rate of return, cov=covariance.7 The author 
underlines that the cost of capital is the “appropriate discount rate for the project” (p. 174) and that ‘‘present 
                                           
6
 “We also have some semantic problems defining exactly what is meant by the value of a non-traded project” (Smith 
and Nau, 1995, p. 804, footnote 7). 
7
 Rubinstein’s proposal is logically equivalent to other classical proposals presented in the late Sixties and early 
Seventies by such scholars as Mossin, Hamada, Tuttle and Litzenberger, Bierman and Hass (see Senbet & Thompson, 
1978, and Magni, 2007b, for a review). 
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value risk-adjusted discount rate … forms of this criterion are easily derived”  (footnote 8, p. 171) as is 
shown by a simple manipulation of the above inequation: 
 
( ) 0/~,~cov1 01
1
0 >
++
+−
XrXr
X
X
mf λ
. 
 
This decision rule boils down “to accepting the project with the highest net present value’’ (footnote 14, p. 
174). It is worth noting that such a NPV is a disequilibrium (cost-based) NPV. Its use is recommended in 
popular finance textbooks (e.g. Copeland & Weston, 1983, 1988; Weston & Copeland, 1988; Bøssaerts & 
Odegaard, 2001) and it is so widespread that Ang and Lewellen (1982) consider it  “the standard 
discounting approach” (p. 9) in finance. Magni (2007a) shows that the procedure suggested by Rubinstein 
violates an accepted standard of rationality: value additivity (warnings against the use of this NPV may also 
be found in Ang & Lewellen, 1982; Grinblatt & Titman, 1998; Ekern, 2006). In particular, the author shows 
that the NPV of a portfolio of projects is different from the sum of the NPVs of the projects (Magni, 2007a, 
Proposition 4.1). This implies that the disequilibrium NPV provides different evaluations (and different 
decisions) depending on to the way the course of action is depicted. Loosely speaking, to receive a 200€ 
banknote or to receive two 100€ banknotes is financially equivalent: to employ the disequilibrium NPV 
means to be trapped in a sort of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985, 1999) because evaluations differ 
depending on whether outcomes are seen as aggregate or disaggregate quantities. This amounts to saying 
that the disequilibrium NPV is inconsistent with the principle of description invariance, which prescribes 
that valuations and decisions must be invariant under changes in description of the same alternative. 
Violations of this principle are known in the heuristics-and-biases tradition as framing effects (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Soman, 2004).8 As opposed to the disequilibrium NPV, 
some scholars advocate the use of an equilibrium NPV (e.g. Bogue & Roll, 1974; Haley & Schall, 1979), 
which is logically deducted from the CAPM as well. It is often expressed in a certainty-equivalent form: 
 ( ) 0
1
~
,
~
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rXX
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This equilibrium NPV is additive, but Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) and Magni (2007a, 2007c) show that 
under certain (realistic) assumptions on the market rate of return, this NPV violates the no-arbitrage 
principle.9 This means that a decision maker complying with the equilibrium NPV is subject to arbitrage 
losses. Therefore, the equilibrium NPV is not consistent with a tenet which is considered a normative 
benchmark for economic rationality (Nau & McCardle, 1991; Nau, 1999). As a result, the two CAPM-based 
NPVs display inconsistencies with accepted standards of rationality. Rigorously speaking, one should say 
                                           
8
 See also Haley & Schall (1979, pp. 182-183), for unreliability of the disequilibrium NPV in ranking projects. 
9
 Magni (2007c) focuses on CAPM-based capital budgeting and shows that the derivative of the NPV function may be 
decreasing with respect to the end-of-period cash flow in some state of nature. Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) focus on 
asset pricing and show that CAPM does not guarantee absence of arbitrage in a security market. 
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that the CAPM-based NPVs inevitably lead decision makers to infringe accepted standards of rationality; 
but attention should not be drawn to decision makers: decision makers whose behaviors comply with this 
model do violate rational benchmarks, but it is not a fault intrinsic in the decision makers’ minds, it is a 
fallacy intrinsic in the very NPV models. 
 Given that no agreed-upon model exists in the literature, “no general analytic solution to the full-
blown financing and investment problem of the firm is currently available. The only recommendation that 
can be made at present is that management must evaluate all options and do the best it can” (Pinches, 1982, 
p. 12, italics added).  
 
4. Normative role of bounded rationality 
The use of  hurdle rates in the NPV procedure bears strict analogies with the tracking-error 
strategies of non-maximizers decision-makers, who compare their payoff to various “nonrational” 
benchmarks. Focusing on a corporate context, Fernández (2002) cites four such benchmarks for 
shareholders’ return: (i) zero (i.e.  wealth increase with respect to the beginning of the year), (ii) return on 
treasury bonds, (iii) shareholders’ return of companies in the same industry, (iv) return of the stock market 
index (pp. 19-20). Others may be used, such as the investors’ own last return or average historical return. 
Berg and Lien (2003), in an expected-utility framework, show that tracking-error decision-makers who, in 
addition to mean and variance, care about a subjectively-determined benchmark, obtain greater shares of 
accumulated wealth than pure mean-variance decision-makers. In analogy to this result, in value-based 
management Young and O’Byrne (2001) explicitly suggest that managers’ compensation plans should be 
based on a historical benchmark such as increase of residual income rather level of residual income, 
because an incentive scheme based on excess-profit improvement is more appropriate to align managers’ 
interests to shareholders’ interests.10 
Cognitive illusions and cognitive limits themselves may be beneficial: Berg and Lien (2005) show 
that an overconfidence bias of non-expert decision-makers may shift a standard financial market 
equilibrium in a Pareto-superior equilibrium, because over-trading leads to improved liquidity and lower 
transaction costs. Similar results are found by Hirshleifer and Luo (2001), De Long et al. (1991), Kyle and 
Wang (1997), Dekel (1999), Gintis (2000). Borges et al. (1999) show that ignorance-based investment 
decisions grounded on the recognition heuristic may outperform funds managed by experts. Berg and 
Gigerenzer (2007) show that it is just a satisficing behavior of the same kind we investigate in this paper 
that leads regulators to intervene less than they would have to in a world in which all agents were 
maximizing neoclassical objective functions. It remains an open issue to ascertain which violations of 
standard rationality are beneficial and in which environment: this is just the normative aim of ecological 
rationality, whose literature is collecting more and more evidence on how heuristics may engender better 
decisions (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). This evidence ought to induce scholars to rethink the norms 
                                           
10
 See Magni, 2009, for an analysis of the notion of residual income. 
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(Gigerenzer, 2006), that is, to accept a normative role of behavioral economics and, more in general, of 
psychology. While a descriptive falsification of unbounded rationality models is the accepted role of 
psychology among the communities of economists and psychologists, a positive role for normative 
justification (corroboration/falsification) of decision-making models and theories may be fruitfully fostered. 
An explicit stance on this issue is taken by Berg (2003), who endorses the use of behavioral economics as a 
normative tool. As regards the NPV model, in particular, we have seen that not only the maximizing model 
leads to violations of accepted standards of rationality (see previous section), but  also that a boundedly 
rational perspective (satisficing) may prove successful. And it is also worth noting that scholars themselves 
are inclined to support the expanded NPV on the basis of its capability of explaining deviations of actual 
behaviors from the normative (traditional) NPV (see section 5).  
Cosmides and Tooby (1994) complain that “psychologists are called in only to provide second-
order corrections to economic theory” (p.327). The growing amount of evidence in the literature of recent 
times shows that psychology and behavioral economics may be called in to provide first-order corrections 
as well, to the benefit of economics and, more importantly, of actual decision makers. 
 
5. NPV rule: heuristic or unboundedly rational model? 
The classical idea that cognitive processes may be divided into two main classes (Gilovich, Griffin 
& Kahneman, 2002) is of some concern in cognitive psychology. According to this view, mental processes 
make use of a heuristic-based system of reasoning and of a rule-based system of reasoning, the former 
being associative and intuitive, the latter being analytic and reflective. The former employs automatic, 
effortless, rapid strategies for decision-making, the latter rests on controlled, effortful, deductive processing 
(Evans, 2004; Sloman, 1996a, 1996b; Sloman, 2002; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Each of the two 
systems has its specific domain, but it is plausible that the two systems are interactive and “function as two 
experts who are working cooperatively to compute sensible answers.” (Sloman, 2002, p. 383). However, 
one never knows where either system begins and where it ends, and the distinction between the two is rather 
fuzzy: it is not easy to find clear-cut differences between them (Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996).  
This is actually testified by the NPV model we are coping with. The NPV model is presented in the 
literature as the solution of an optimization problem (e.g. Fisher, 1930, Rubinstein, 1973; Dixit & Pindyck, 
1994; McMinn, 2005). Still, there is evidence that it is a mixed methodology, a blending of logical and 
ecological rationality. As may be inferred by several historical surveys, it is the result of rigorous 
mathematical thinking associated to a more intuitive and adaptive thinking of skillful decision makers. In a 
period where the quest for axiomatic models was cogent, Fisher (1930) just gave an optimization dress to a 
technique that was practiced long since: since Fibonacci’s present-value analysis in 12th century 
(Goetzmann, 2005), contributions from mathematicians, philosophers, engineering economists, actuarial 
scientists nourished and were nourished by the non-optimizing evaluations of properties, trees, lands, 
collieries, coppices, buildings, leases, shops etc. made by the legal, banking, business communities (Wing, 
1965; Edwards & Warman, 1981; Miller & Napier, 1993; Scorgie, 1996; Brackenborough, McLean & 
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Oldroyd, 2001). The use of a systematic discounting procedure adjusted to reflect personal judgment is 
exemplified in actual evaluations accomplished across centuries: Scorgie (1996) shows that since 13th  
century “the capitalised value or selling price of arable land and other property was determined by 
multiplying the annual rental by some generally accepted factor” (p. 240, italics added), which is 
interpretable as a discount factor. A valuation of Lord Cromwell’s property in 1469 was obtained by using a 
factor of 20.11 The latter only “provided a base valuation” (ibidem) and could be changed depending on the 
case at hand: “The provision for the use of another rate provided some leeway” (Scorgie, 1996, p. 240). 
Variations were governed by several domain-specific factors, among which “the need to use a higher 
interest rate where an investment project involved hazards and uncertainty” (p. 242). For example, the risk 
of flooding for a coal mine (ruinous event) could suggest to decrease the factor from 20 to 4 or to 3 (i.e. 
raise the discount rate to 25% or 33.33%) (p. 244). Brackenborough, McLean and Oldroyd (2001), focusing 
on the Tyneside coal industry in the 18th century, report the use of a NPV rule where cash flows “were 
discounted at interest rates to reflect the viewer’s assessment of risk” (p. 141), which means that the 
“responsibility for assessing the degree of risk was placed firmly in the hand of the client” (p. 144). Quoting 
directly from original records, the authors confirm that the discount rates reflected “the purchasers’ own 
ideas of the risk and prospects of the concern” and that the decision makers should “judge for himself, and 
draw his own conclusions” (p. 144). Analysts just provided the formal framework, while leaving investors 
free to use the rule subjectively “through adjustment of the discount rate” (pp. 150-151). The use of a 
rigorous procedure combined with personal evaluation is also confirmed by Wing (1965), who analyzes a 
paper by Van Deventer (1915) where a foreman provides the owner of a small machine shop with what can 
be seen as an unstated NPV criterion: “First, estimate the probable saving that the investment will make … 
Second, assign a probable length of life to it … Third, estimate what the investment will cost … Fourth, 
pick out a minimum rate of return that you will expect” (Wing, 1965, p. 475). That minimum rate of return 
is a “desired profit rate” (ibidem) in a satisficing sense. That the choice of the rate was meant to be 
subjective is confirmed by the table Van Deventer provides in his paper: it “was supplied with a range of 
rates of return into which he [the shop owner] could fit his personal minimum expected rate” (Wing, 1965, 
p. 479, italics added). This cooperation is brought into play even in the immaculate unbounded rationality 
reign, though hardly recognized: when suggesting the use of dynamic programming, Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994) explicitly leave decision makers free to set their own desired discount rates: “dynamic programming 
can … be used to maximize the present value of the firm’s expected flow of profits, subject to an arbitrary 
discount rate” (p. 149, italics added); “we can … use a dynamic programming approach with an 
exogenously specified discount rate” (p. 185); “The dynamic programming approach started by specifying 
the discount rate, ρ , exogenously as a part of the objective function” (p. 120). To present a maximization 
problem where the objective function depends on an arbitrary (thus subjective) hurdle rate means to suggest 
a blending of an unboundedly rational procedure and a boundedly rational heuristic. Interestingly, the 
                                           
11
 The implicit discount rate is 5% = (1/20)*100. 
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authors themselves are puzzled by their own proposal: “One problem with this investment rule is that it is 
based on an arbitrary …. discount rate ρ . It is not clear where this discount rate should come from” (p. 
147). Yet, their classical book heavily (and commendably) relies on this hybrid NPV rule. Even McDonald 
(2000), in presenting the maximization procedure, significantly admits:  “We will be agnostic about the 
determination of ρ ” (p. 16).  
One may even conjecture that the birth of the sophisticated version of the NPV rule (the expanded 
NPV) has been favored by empirical researches: the latter may have induced scholars to develop a new 
enhanced NPV capable of explaining the empirical deviations from the traditional NPV rule. This is drawn 
from their explicit concern about explanation of actual choice behaviors:  
 
Some recent developments in the theory of investment under uncertainty have offered an interesting new 
 explanation of these phenomena … This new approach suggests that textbooks pictures of the dynamics of a 
 competitive industry need … substantial redrawing”. (Dixit, 1992, p. 108, italics added)  
 
The real options literature can explain why using a discount rate that is higher than the cost of capital is a 
 good strategy when waiting opens up better opportunities. Such a discount rate is typically referred to as the 
 hurdle rate. (J&M, 2002, p. 13, italics added) 
 
The option insight also helps explain why the actual investment behaviour of firms differs from the received 
 wisdom taught in business schools. Firms invest in projects that are expected to yield a return in excess of a 
 required, “hurdle” rate … such hurdle rates are typically three or four times the cost of capital … firms do 
 not invest until price rises substantially above long-run average cost. On the downside, firms stay in business 
 for lengthy periods while absorbing losses, and price can fall substantially below average variable cost 
 without disinvestment or exit. This also seems to conflict with standard theory, but … it can be explained 
 once irreversibility and option value are accounted for. (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 7, italics added) 
 
We found qualitative implications, and several approximate quantitative ones, that conform to 
 experience―the high hurdle rates used by business firms when they judge investment projects, the 
 relative inefficacy of interest rate cuts as policies to stimulate investment projects, the significant and 
 detrimental effect of policy uncertainty on investment, and so on. (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 425) 
 
…there is considerable anecdotal evidence that firms make investment decisions in a way that is at 
 least roughly consistent with the theory developed in this book (for example, the use of hurdle rates that are 
 much larger than the opportunity cost of capital as predicted by the CAPM). (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, p. 
 296, italics added) 
 
These claims may be interpreted as a regard for providing a theory that should conform to decision makers’ 
actual choices: “note that options advocates justify options models over [traditional] net present value 
(NPV) models precisely because the assumptions of the options models fit the reality better than the 
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assumptions of the [traditional] NPV model” (Bromiley, 2005, p. 69, italics added). This means that 
scholars themselves implicitly (and unawarely) endorse a normative role for psychology and behavioral 
economics. Thus, if decision makers do not abide by a normative theory, they should not be tagged as 
irrational. Rather, one could infer that theory exhibits “failures”, “anomalies” (Dixit & Pindyck, p. 4), 
“abstraction from reality (J&M; p. 5), “misleading results” (Bromiley, 2005, p. 69). Decision makers’ 
heuristics may give insights for construction of new theories and models that take account of information, 
context, environment and personal evaluation. Unbounded rationality alone is not sufficient: 
 
 Any decision-making framework, however, can only improve a manager’s understanding of the problem at 
 hand and help him/her to make a more informed and consistent decision. No decision-making framework can 
 guarantee a “good” outcome and there is no substitute for managerial effort, creativity, experience, 
 knowledge, and critical thinking…” (Lander & Pinches, 1998, p. 542, italics added).  
 
The “environmental indifference that is often assumed by many financial theories and models is not a 
reasonable assumption for the future” (Crum & Derkinderen, 1981, p. 237, italics added): the quest for a 
cooperation of bounded and unbounded rationality is compelling. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The heuristics-and-biases program draws attention to logical fallacies of human reasoning which 
cloud human minds (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1996): choice behaviors are biased because they deviate from accepted standards of rationality. By 
contrast, advocates of bounded rationality are concerned with showing that heuristics may often prove 
useful in decision-making (Gigerenzer, Todd & the ABC Research Group, 1999). The latter aver that 
cognitive illusions disappear once heuristics are seen as adaptive tools rather than logical devices for 
solving decision-making processes (Gigerenzer, 1996; Gigerenzer, 2000). Gigerenzer and the ABC group 
endorse the idea that human beings’ rationality is ecological rather than logical, and their fast-and-frugal-
heuristics program aims at presenting a number of heuristics that are successfully applied in real-life in 
specific environments. This work deals with the NPV maximization model, which is a keystone in 
economics and finance. The main results may be summarized as follows: 
 
(1) real-life decision makers often use the NPV criterion, but discount cash flows with a hurdle rate which 
 differs from the cost of capital normatively suggested (e.g. CAPM, arbitrage pricing, multifactor 
 models)  
(2) the hurdle-rate rule may be interpreted as a boundedly rational approach to investment decisions: 
 decision makers rest on aspiration levels subjectively determined 
(3) some empirical evidence shows that the bounded-rationality approach is ecologically rational, domain-
 specific, psychologically plausible. The hurdle-rate rule leads to close-to-optimal solutions when 
 confronted with the expanded NPV 
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(4) several factors affect the hurdle rate, among which: decision flexibility, future opportunities, rationing 
 of managerial skills, strategic considerations, agency costs, costs of external financing. Risk is 
 another factor as well, but the notion of risk is not equivalent to the risk measures employed in 
 analytical models 
(5) consistency with several theories and models is highlighted, among which real options approach, 
 resource-based theory, Top Management Team literature, agency theory, strategic management 
 literature. The hurdle rate is set at a base level but is not rigidly applied: possible fluctuations 
 around the base level depend on various domain-specific and project-specific factors (such as the 
 drivers just mentioned) 
(6) the NPV maximizing model is not univocal: it may take on several different dressings. The use a 
 particular version depends on the circumstances: for example, the arbitrage-pricing NPV may not 
 be used if the actual market is not complete. Some of the versions are often inapplicable and/or 
 reveal inconsistencies with accepted standards of rationality (additivity, no-arbitrage, description 
 invariance) 
(7) a normative role for psychology and behavioral economics may prove useful in construction of new 
 theories and revision of older ones on the basis of actual behaviors 
(8) an interaction between the two systems of rationality may improve performance. Actually, the very 
 distinction between the two systems of reasoning is rather artificial and only useful as a metaphor 
 (see Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996): as attested by recent historical researches, the origins of the NPV 
 just lie in the common efforts of various categories of people facing the need of both logical and 
 eco-logical rationality.  
 
This paper may suggest a direction for research and hopefully will act as a stimulus for further inquiries. 
The scientific niche that might be disclosed could offer unexpected views about bounded and unbounded 
rationality and their interrelations. A possible payoff of such a view is that bounded rationality and 
unbounded rationality are not necessarily rivals. After all, unbounded rationality itself, as derived from 
logic and mathematics, may not abstain to consider itself as a derivation of ecological rationality: logic and 
mathematics should be intended as the most advanced step of human simulation, and simulation is a tool for 
anticipating; as such, it is indispensable for discovering and creating. The impressive degree we have 
achieved in such an ability may be seen as the result of an evolutionary process, in which its surviving value 
has been adaptively tested. Therefore, logic and mathematics, as symbolic tools, assemble the experience of 
our ancestors (Monod, 1970, pp. 171-172). To put it in a nutshell, even logic is ecological. 
More “fluid theories” and more mixed methodologies will help us understand decision makers and 
help decision makers cope with complex decision problems. With the pleasant by-product of conciliating 
the two rival parties. 
 
Acknowledgment. The author wishes to thank Nathan Berg for his invaluable remarks and suggestions. 
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